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Abstract. Attackers can exploit covert channels, such as timing side-channels, to
transmit information without data owners or network administrators being aware.
Sneak-Peek is a recently considered data centre attack, where, in a multi-tenant
setting, an insider attacker can communicate with colluding outsiders by inten-
tionally adding delays to traffic on logically isolated but physically shared links.
Timing attack mitigations typically introduce delays or randomness which can
make it difficult to understand the trade-off between level of security (bandwidth
of the covert channel) and performance loss. We demonstrate that formal meth-
ods can help. We analyse the impacts of two Sneak-Peek mitigations, namely,
noise addition and path hopping. We provide a precise mathematical model of
the attack and of the effectiveness these defences. This mathematical analysis is
extended by two tool-based stochastic formal models, one formalized in UPPAAL
and the other in CARMA. The formal models can capture more general and larger
networks than a paper-based analysis, can be used to check properties and make
measurements, and are more easily modifiable than conventional network simu-
lations. With UPPAAL, we can analyse the effectiveness of mitigations and with
CARMA, we can analyse how these mitigations affect latencies in typical data
centre topologies. As results, we show that using a selective strategy for path hop-
ping is better than a random strategy, that using the two defences in conjunction
may actually be worse than using a single defence, and we show the connection
between hop frequency and network latency.
1 Introduction
By exploiting covert channels, attackers can learn useful information without the data
owners or network administrators realising that information has been leaked. Covert
channels are wide-ranging and in general, may be difficult to detect and defend against.
They include timing channels, such as the Spectre and Meltdown CPU vulnerabilities,
where information is transmitted by delays in a computation or message timings [6,
12, 24]; storage channels, where information is transmitted by using shared locations;
information is transmitted from electrical power consumption [7].
There are ways to identify potential covert channels [14]; then mitigation mecha-
nisms can be deployed, such as blinding mechanisms to conceal transmitted data [3].
Mitigations typically penalise performance, however, imposing additional computation
2or adding artificial delays [9]. Therefore, before deploying a countermeasure, one must
analyze the impacts it may have in the network, understanding the trade-offs between
security and (network) performance. A security engineer needs to answer questions
such as: Which defences should I use?, Where should they be used?, Under which (traf-
fic) assumptions will the defence work?, What will be the performance penalty?
This paper shows that mathematical analysis and formal methods can help answer
these questions. We study the Sneak-Peek attack introduced by Tahir et al [24]. Sneak-
Peek is a high-rate covert channel in multi-tenant cloud computing environments. An
insider attacker in a host of one client can transmit information to colluders in another
client by intentionally adding delays to internal communications that happen to share
a physical link with the outside colluders. The external colluders receive the signalled
messages despite their machines being logically isolated from the first client.
The Sneak-Peek attack is illustrated and explained below:
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sharing a common path
– The carrier sends a constant stream of packets to the peeker using the channel. This
traffic is allowed as both are outside the trusted network.
– The leaker sends a stream of packets to a host H inside the trusted network using
the same channel.
– The leaker encodes data by adding delays to the stream: a delay encodes a binary
’1’ and no delay encodes ’0’. The encoding is agreed by all colluding participants.
– Delays inserted by the leaker cause (blue) packets sent by the carrier to reach the
peeker later. By measuring arrival times, the peeker can decode the leaked data.
Tahir et al suggested a defence mechanism for this attack based on path hopping:
redirecting traffic dynamically to avoid the potentially compromised links. This de-
fence is possible with Software-Defined Networks (SDNs) used in data centres: the
SDN controller has a global view on traffic and can change routings dynamically under
algorithmic control. Here we precisely analyse two defence mechanisms:
– Background traffic: additional (random) traffic interferes with timing channels by
disrupting latency measurements used for signalling.
– Path hopping: the SDN controller can migrate network flows to different paths.
Different paths have different delays and might not be shared externally, so path
hopping mitigates Sneak-Peak timing channels.
Tahir et al considered the impact of background traffic on the covert channel, but with-
out directly considering it as a mitigation in itself. They proposed several strategies for
path hopping, but we take their analysis much further, as well as introducing stochastic
formal methods to model the situation.
3Contributions. In summary, our main contributions are:
1. A mathematical analysis using probability and information theory of the Sneak-
Peek attack and the effectiveness of the two mitigations above.
2. A formal model using timed automata in the UPPAAL tool [4], which captures the
Sneak-Peek attack, and can verify and measure transmission of data on the covert
channel, including with background traffic and a simple form of path hopping.
3. A formal model built from parametric specifications in CARMA [17], which can
capture more complex topologies and investigate the network latency imposed by
different mitigation strategies. CARMA has a continuous-time Markov chain se-
mantics and is designed to model collective adaptive systems.
4. Using the above, numerical results about channel bandwidth, attack effectiveness
and network overheads. Results are compared between the mathematical analysis
and tools as an internal validation.
Our work represents novel applications of the formal methods chosen, a novel combi-
nation of methods, and also obtains new results about the attack scenario.
Overview of paper. An outline of the paper and results is as follows:
– Section 2 starts with the simple topology (four hosts and two nodes) used in [24],
and introduces our mathematical approach and first UPPAAL model. From the (dif-
ferent) mathematical analysis and formal model, we obtain measurements of chan-
nel capacity which agree with one another and with previous results in [24].
– Section 3 studies background traffic and its effect on the covert channel. The math
and the UPPAAL model reveal that the success of the Sneak-Peek attack is sensitive
to background traffic, suggesting its use directly as a mitigation (e.g., by injecting
noise, or mixing traffic from elsewhere).
– Section 4 examines path hopping. Maths demonstrates the difference between a
random path hopping strategy versus one which chooses a path deterministically:
path hopping using a deterministic strategy among paths of different delay lengths
can be better than hopping randomly. The UPPAAL model becomes more com-
plex than the paper analysis: multiple paths and background traffic are modelled
together, demonstrating how to answer some of the questions above. We show that
using both defences together is not always better than either alone.
– Section 5 describes our parametric model in CARMA. A problem with timed au-
tomata is that for a new network topology, one needs specify the whole model from
scratch. Instead, the CARMA implementation is based on a specification of the net-
work, that is, its nodes and connections, and outputs a formal model which can be
simulated or model-checked. This allows us to easily model large, more realistic
networks. Our main goal with CARMA is to analyze the increase of network la-
tency incurred by deploying defences on a typical data centre topology fragment
(so-called 4-ary fat tree). Justified by our mathematical analysis, we propose strate-
gies for path hopping: the key idea is to target flows over shared infrastructure that
are likely to carry covert channels. We analyse this defence in CARMA on the data
centre, assessing its impact on network latency. Simulation results here show that,
in general, path hopping is a rather expensive mitigation.
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper, mentioning some of the related work.
42 Simple timing channels
In the following, we provide a precise analytical model (Section 2.1) of the Sneak-Peek
attack and we validate it using UPPAAL (Section 2.2).
2.1 An analytic model
Let us assume that the leaker X sends packets to the host H with probablity p = P (X =
1). The carrier Y sends packets to the peeker Z constantly, i.e., P (Y = 1) = 1. Here,
we formalise each entity as a random variable. The delay T denotes: the difference
between departure and arrival times of a packet from Y to Z if packets from Y can
only be delayed by packets from X; otherwise, the inter-arrival time for packets from
Y. The peeker recovers the secret sent by X from T using the rule: Z = 1 if T > θ and
Z = 0 if T ≤ θ, with θ a threshold on T .
The channel capacity [8, Chapter 7] is the maximum mutual information between
X and Z over the probability distribution of X . We calculate it as follows. First, we
assume that given X the delay T follows the normal distribution: T |(X = i∈{0,1}) ∼
N ((i + 1)µ, σ2), where µ is the average delay for a packet from Y going through the
channel, and σ is the standard deviation. Then, the probabilities of decoding errors are:
err0 = P (Z = 1|X = 0) = P (T > θ|X = 0) = 1− Φ((θ − µ)/σ)
err1 = P (Z = 0|X = 1) = P (T ≤ θ|X = 1) = Φ ((θ − 2µ)/σ)
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. We
have the mutual information I(X;Z) between X and Z:
I(X;Z) =
∑
X,Z
P (Z|X)P (X) log P (Z|X)
P (Z)
= H2(1− err0 + (err0 + err1 − 1)× p)− (1− p)H2(err0)− pH2(err1)
where H2(x) = −x log x− (1− x) log(1− x). The capacity C∈[0,1] of this channel is
H2
(
1
1 + 2
H2(err0)−H2(err1)
1−err0−err1
)
−
(
1− (1 + h)(1− err0)− 1
(1 + h)(1− err0 − err1)
)
H2(err0)− pH2(err1)
which is achieved when dI(X;Z)dp = 0. Since we have no idea of what kind of secret will
be sent, it is unreasonable to claim that the probability p depends on decoding errors
erri∈{0,1}. A feasible assumption on the probability distribution of X is p = 0.5, i.e.,
the same probability for 0s and 1s (the message may well be compressed or encrypted).
Note that this is not a conventional binary symmetric channel [8], because there are
different decoding errors.
Example 1. We assume that the average delay is 40ms if X doesn’t send a packet and
80ms if X sends a packet. The standard deviations both are 10ms. We set the threshold
θ to 60ms at which the total error err0 +err1 achieves the minimum value 0.0456. Then,
5Fig. 1. Timed automata for the carrier (to the left) and the leaker (to the right).
Fig. 2. Timed automata for the peeker (to the left) and the decoding process (to the right).
the capacity is 0.843 which is achieved when p = 0.5. Shannon’s Theorem [23] tells
us that the channel capacity is the maximum achievable information rate. So, an upper
bound of bandwidth (KB/s) for this channel is: (B/(1+pS))C, with S the average size
(KB) of packets sent by X and Y, and B the average bandwidth (KB/s) of physical links
available for this channel. If the packet size is 64KB on average and the bandwidth is
1GB/s, the upper bound of bandwidth is 1.12 KB/s.
2.2 A formal model in UPPAAL
While the mathematical analysis provides precise analysis, the combinatorial problem
involved explodes with the increase of network paths. We now start to address this
problem, by manually formalising simple timing channels in UPPAAL (Figs 1,2). We
simulate the Sneak-Peek attack and validate the mathematical analysis given in previous
section.
The simple channel is modelled as a queue with a delay following a normal distri-
bution with mean mu and standard deviation 1. Fig. 1 (left) models the carrier. Initial
state Init Wait is denoted by a double circle. Invariant t <= T, where t is a local clock,
ensures that a transition has to occur within T time units. Sending a packet is modelled
by storing a packet in a shared variable buf input, followed by signalling a synchronisa-
tion by chan input!. ! denotes triggers of a synchronization, and ? denotes the receiver.
A state with a C is a committed state, which constrains that no time elapses when it
is involved in a transition. With committed states, it can be ensured that time intervals
of sending packets is exactly T time units. Similarly, in Fig. 1 (right), for every T time
6units, the leaker decides whether to send a packet to the channel or not depending on the
current bit of the message to be leaked. The leaker and the carrier are not synchronised
in reality. This is specified in our model by the additional delays added for the leaker.
As shown in Fig. 2 (left), the peeker records the arrival time for each packet with clocks
t rcv[i]. The message is recovered by calculating inter-arrival in Fig. 2 (right).
Running simulation with {N = 10, T = 4, mu = 4, theta = 6} in UPPAAL, we get
an average accuracy 94.5% out of 7598 runs. That is, the decoding error rate is 0.055
which is close to the value (0.0456) produced by mathematical analysis in Section 2.1.
3 Timing channels with background traffic
In this section, we extend the mathematical model and the UPPAAL model for simple
timing channels with background traffic.
3.1 Modelling background traffic
We assume that Y sends a packet every t seconds. Let N be the random variable char-
acterising the background traffic, namely, the number of packets from the background
traffic within a time interval t. We assume that N follows the Poisson distribution:
P (N = k) ∼ e−λ λkk! , with λ the average number of packets from the background traf-
fic within a time interval t. Let us suppose that given X and N the delay T follows the
normal distribution: T |(X = i∈{0,1}, N = k∈N) ∼ N ((k+ i+ 1)µ, σ2). When X and
N are independent, the probabilities of decoding errors are:
err0 = P (Z = 1|X = 0) =
∑
k
P (T > θ|X = 0 ∧N = k)P (N = k)
= e−λ
∑
k
(
1− Φ
(
θ − (k + 1)µ
σ
))
λk
k!
err1 = P (Z = 0|X = 1) = e−λ
∑
k
Φ
(
θ − (k + 2)µ
σ
)
λk
k!
It is not necessary that N follows the Poisson distribution. The decoding errors can be
customised by using a distribution from the empirical study of network traffic in data
centres, e.g., Log-normal and Weibull distributions [5].
Example 2. Let us suppose that Y sends a packet every t seconds and the average
number of packets from the background traffic is λ = 0.5 within the time interval
t. We assume that within the time interval t the maximum number of packets from
the background traffic is K = 3; and T |(X,N) follows the normal distribution with
µ = 40ms and σ = 10ms. Let us set the threshold θ to 32µ = 60ms. The proba-
bilities of decoding errors are err0 ≈ 0.3986 and err1 ≈ 0.0138 . The mutual infor-
mation between X and Z with P (X = 1) = 0.5 is 0.3528 . That is, the background
traffic at the level of 0.5t packets/s, reduces the upper bound of information rate from
0.843 to 0.3528. If the bandwidth of physical links is B = 1GB/s and the average
size of packets is S = 64KB, then an upper bound of the channel bandwidth is:
(B/((1 + 0.5 + λ)S))C ≈ 2890.1 bits/s ≈ 0.3528 KB/s.
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Fig. 3. The timing channels are sensitive to background traffic (left). The selective path hopping
is more effective than the random path hopping when the threshold is fixed (right).
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Fig. 4. Simulation of impact of background traffic to leakage accuracy.
The left graph in Fig. 3 demonstrates how the background traffic affects the capacity
of simple timing channels. Here, the symbol λ denotes the average number of packets
from the background traffic within a time interval 0.1s. When λ is 0, i.e., there is no
background traffic, the mutual information I0.5(X;Z) achieves the highest value 0.843.
This value drops quickly when λ increases. This is mainly due to the increase of the
probability err0 of decoding errors. The peeker can set the threshold θ according to the
parameter λ, so as to reduce the effect caused by the background traffic, e.g., setting θ
to (1 + λ)µ. However, the recovery of channel capacity is limited, because the packets
from the background traffic dominate the delay T when λ increases.
3.2 Extending the UPPAAL model
We extend the formal model given in Section 2.2 by adding a timed automaton for back-
ground traffic which sends a packet to the channel at an exponential rate of lambda. By
running simulation with {N = 10, T = 4, mu = 4, theta = 6} and different lambda, we
summarise the relation between lambda and accuracy in Fig. 4. The accuracy drops
dramatically when background traffic rate increases from 0 to 1.25, but remains at the
same level afterwards. Also, the accuracy does not drop below 50%, because back-
ground traffic can only introduce additional delays to turn 0 to 1, but cannot shorten
the network delay to convert 1 to 0. This is consistent with our mathematical analysis
results depicted in Fig. 3.
4 Mitigating timing channel attacks
We extend our mathematical model and UPPAAL model with path hopping. Path hop-
ping is a timing channel mitigation mechanism in SDN. The assumption behind this
8method is: if trusted and untrusted networks share several paths, then hopping between
these paths will reduce the capacity of timing channels. We illustrate its use next.
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Example 3. Consider the extension of the simple timing channel depicted in the above
figure with two paths A and B shared between trusted and untrusted networks. Assume
that the average delay of a packet from Y going through A and B is respectively 10ms
and 20ms and from X is, respectively, 15ms and 25ms. We assume that X and Y send
packets at the same rate, e.g., X sends zero or one packet and Y sends one packet
every 6ms. Once a packet is received by the switch, it chooses a path from A and
B and sends the packet using the chosen path. Assume packets which are sent at the
time n with n odd, will use path A; and other packets will use path B. Setting the
threshold θ to the average of delays, i.e., 17.5ms, the peeker Z can recover the secret
from delays by applying the rules given in Section 2.1. However, using two paths A and
B will affect the packet arrival time, e.g., the packets 1 (16ms) and 5 (45ms) respectively
arrive earlier than the packets 0 (25ms) and 4 (49ms), the peeker Z actually gets the
bit sequence 011001 which contains five decoding errors, comparing to the original
bit sequence 100111 sent by X. So apart from noise caused by delays, path hopping
introduces another kind of noise: as bits may be received out-of-order.
4.1 A mathematical analysis of path hopping
Assume that the delay of a path A follows the normal distribution, i.e., TA|(X = 0) ∼
N (µA, σ2A) and TA|(X = 1) ∼ N (µ′A, σ2A). The probabilities of decoding errors of
the path A are errA0 and err
A
1 . Let q denote the probability of disorder for a packet sent
by Y. By disorder we mean that the nth packet arrives later than the mth packet when
m > n, which only happens when a flow is switched from a slower to a quicker path.
The decoding errors are:
erri = (1− q)×
∑
A
(P (A)× errAi ) + q × P (Z = 1− i) .
By solving the above equations we have:
erri = (1− q)× EA(errAi ) +
q
2
× (1 + EA(errAi )− EA(errA1−i))
whereEA denotes the expectation ranging over paths. The average radius r¯ of disorders
caused by a hop from a slower path A to a quicker path B is E(A,B)(b(µA+µ′A−µB−
9µ′B)/(2t)c). Let α be the number of hops in one millisecond and β be the probability of
hopping from a slower to a quicker path. We approximate q by: min(1.0, α×β×2r¯1/t ) ≈
min(1.0, αβ × E(A,B)(µA + µ′A − µB − µ′B)).
Example 4. Consider the collection {(µA = n×20ms, µ′A = 2n×20ms) | 1 ≤ n ≤ 3}
of paths with standard derivation σ = 5ms. Suppose that every path has the same chance
to be chosen, i.e., P (A) = 13 . Setting the threshold θ to the average delays of these
paths, i.e., 60ms, we get the average probabilities of decoding errors:EA(errA0 ) ≈ 0.174
and EA(errA1 ) ≈ 0.333. Assuming that every hop from a slower path to a quicker path
has the same probability 13 , we get the probability q of disorders: min(1.0, αβ × 80) .
We can randomly hop from one path to another in which the probability β of hopping
from a slower to a quicker path is 12 . A better hopping strategy is the path selective, e.g.,
following the hop sequence CBAC with C is slower than B and B is slower than A.
The selective strategy gives us a higher probability β = 23 . Let α range over [0, 0.025],
i.e., from zero hop to 25 hops per second. We calculate the channel capacity and show
the results as the right graph in Fig. 3. By increasing the number of hops the channel
capacity can be reduced to 0. In this example, zero capacity is achieved respectively at
19 (selective) and 25 (random) hops per second.
4.2 Modelling and analysing path hopping in UPPAAL
We further extend our UPPAAL model by adding path hopping (random replacement
and random selection [24]). Our analysis demonstrates that the effectiveness of path
hopping is reduced with the increase of background traffic and the decrease on the
number of flows. So the (expensive) path hopping defence should not be used when
background traffic is high and especially when there are few flows.
A K-path channel is abstracted as K independent queues with an individual delay
mu. Each queue also has a path id ranging from 0 to K - 1. Assuming that there are
N FLOWS flows in the network, each packet is assigned with a flow id ranging from 0 to
N LOWS - 1, where 0 and 1 are reserved for the carrier and the leaker, and the remaining
ones are for background traffic. Array flow path[N FLOWS] is introduced to associate a
flow to a path so that packets can be distributed to the right queue.Fig. 5 (right) models
path hopping mitigation. For every time period of alpha, each path flips an equal coin
to deicide whether to update with a random path id in flow path, or not.
We run two groups of simulation with common parameters of {N = 10, T = 4, mu =
4, theta = 6, K = 8, alpha = 10} and different numbers of background traffic flows (#bgt),
i.e. 2 and 10. The results are depicted in Fig. 6 (left) together with the data from Fig. 4
(the accuracy with background traffic only) for comparison. The effect of path hopping
without background traffic, i.e. 55%, is also shown as a reference line. Fig. 6 (right)
zooms in the area of 1 ≤ lambda ≤ 5. The results show that path hopping can reduce
the accuracy significantly when 0 ≤ lambda ≤ 1. However, when 1 ≤ lambda ≤ 5
and background traffic has decreased the accuracy to a low range, the impact of path
hopping becomes very small. Moreover, in the case of #bgt = 2, the accuracy goes up
slightly comparing to the result with background traffic only. The following table shows
the simulation results of the relation between the accuracy and #bgt when lambda = 5.
10
Fig. 5. Timed automata for path hopping.
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Fig. 6. Impact of path hopping with different number of background traffic flows (#bgt). The
figure on the right zooms in the area of where left one when 1 ≤ lambda ≤ 5.
#bgt 1 2 3 4 6 8 10 12
Accuracy 53.0% 52.3% 51.5% 51.0% 50.8% 50.7% 50.8% 50.8%
When #bgt gets smaller, the accuracy becomes closer to the case when applying path
hopping without background traffic. The cause is that, when #bgt is small, path hopping
is more likely to reduce the amount of background traffic in the channel where the
attacker flow stays, and weakens the impact of background traffic.
Our results tell that path hopping keeps the accuracy in a low range. However,
blindly applying might not always have positive impact, especially when background
traffic rate is high and the #bgt is low.
5 Considering network topology
We now consider a different approach using the quantitative modelling language CARMA
[17]. CARMA has semantics based on continuous-time Markov chain semantics and is
supported by the CARMA Eclipse Plug-in [11]. CARMA has an expressive syntax for
directed graphs making it appropriate and efficient for network modelling. This allows
for a generic model which is parametrised by a specific network configuration using the
syntax. An example is:
space network_name (){
nodes { [Sw1]; [Sw2]; [Sw3]; }
connections { [Sw1] -> [Sw2] {port = 1}; ... }}
This specifies three switches and a link from the first switch to the second switch via port
1. Nodes have type location and there are various operators defined over this type to
obtain pre-sets, post-sets and edge weights such as port. A manually constructed space
model can be used to obtain the topology of the network semi-automatically during
simulation of the CARMA model and automatic generation can be implemented in a
straightforward manner.
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Fig. 7. Probability of network infrastructure shared by attackers (left) and comparison of latency
with and without path hopping (right)
We present two scenarios: the first is similar to the UPPAAL model where we con-
sider the probability of shared network infrastructure, and the second is the fat-tree
topology used in data centres where we consider the cost of mitigation.
Fig. 7 illustrates the results of using MultiVeStA [22], a statistical model checker
integrated into the CARMA command line tool, which can assess the probability of
events or mean of values of interest expressed as temporal logic formulae. We use a
formula that describes the probability of the sneaker and peeker sharing the one of the
two switches for a given duration under random path hopping (where both selection and
placement are random). As can be seen with frequent path hopping (every 25ms), there
is a high probability that there will be shared infrastructure for at least one duration of
250ms; however, the probability of shared infrastructure for a period of 1s is negligible.
With less frequent path hopping (at every half second) it is less likely that the durations
of shared infrastructure occur.
We also want to assess the impact of the path hopping mitigation on the network
performance for a larger networking scenario using SDN, and thereby evaluate the
trade-offs between security and performance. Working with an SDN model, we can
quantify the cost of path hopping by considering different frequencies of rule updates
(which are necessary to determine new routes at the switch level). We measure overall
packet latency (the average time taken by a packet from host to destination) to deter-
mine the reduction in performance caused by this mitigation. Fat-trees [1] improve on
a single-rooted tree by providing multiple paths between hosts, and the size of the net-
work depends on the number of ports in a switch. for k ports, there are 5k2/4 switches
supporting k3/4 hosts and providing k2/4 paths between each pair of hosts.
Our model describes a 4-ary fat-tree where hosts generate and accept packets, the
switches route packets according to their rule tables. The controller installs the flow
rules in the switches initially, requests traffic information from the switches and deter-
mines when to switch flows. Packet generation is determined by exponential distribu-
tions, and can be specified for each host individually. Previous research shows that the
time taken for 10 rule updates [21] varies from 1 ms (milliseconds) to 20 ms depending
on the type of switch. In our model, we assume that the time taken is exponentially dis-
tributed with average 1 ms. We have two clients, and in each client there is low traffic
between all hosts and one large flow between two hosts which traverses infrastructure
that may be shared.
Fig. 7 shows the costs of path hopping (with random selection and placement) in
terms of how it affects latency. We assume that data collection from switches is done
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before path hopping to allow for non-random selection and placement of flows, and we
include this cost even in the random case. The blue line in the graph shows how as the
frequency of path hopping decreases so does the latency. At a path hopping interval
of 1 second, the impact is negligible compared with latency for no path swapping and
data collection every 1 second. However, with more frequent path hopping every 25ms,
there is a 50% increase in latency.
Earlier results in Section 4.1 show that with a rate of around 20 hops/s (depending on
the type of path hopping used) without background traffic, a covert channel’s capacity
can be reduced to zero. But this is very expensive in terms of the cost of switch updating.
Even at a path hopping frequency of 100ms, there is a penalty of 10% to latency. This
suggests that any potential flow selection and/or placement procedure that reduces the
necessity of frequent path hopping would improve path hopping as a mitigation for
covert channel attacks, such as selecting a flow route which includes network elements
that may be shared. Additionally, we could investigate approaches to mitigation that
are not possible in current switches such as choosing probabilistically between two
routes at the switch-level. Approaches suggested here might also be combined with
load balancing methods such as CONGA [2].
6 Conclusions and related work
We set out to investigate data centre attacks and their mitigations by applying rigorous
and formal methods. We extended the initial work on the Sneak-Peek attack [24] by
applying a mathematical analysis feeding in to two formal models, the UPPAAL model
which captures low-level details of the covert channel between a small number of nodes,
and the CARMA model which extends to larger data centre topology fragments. These
models let us explore new questions which, in conventional networking research, the
burden of full simulation (or real experiments on testbeds) would have made overly
time consuming to explore. Some high-level conclusions were:
– a selective strategy for path hopping mitigation can beat a random strategy;
– using path hopping together with background traffic mixing may be worse than
using either mitigation alone;
– on data centre topologies, even with SDN, over-enthusiastic use of path hopping
may incur an unreasonably large cost on network latency.
Taken together, our investigation suggests that the most functional and cost-effective
mitigations should take into account topology and existing traffic flows. Thus, SDN-
based mitigations may be appropriate but, at least for the Sneak-Peek example, may
need to be more intricate than some of the algorithms deployed so far.
In general, we believe that our “mixed formal methods” approach may be useful for
similar security problems in applied networking and network security and we are eager
to apply them further. Ultimately, for a solution being considered for real deployment,
we would of course want to validate the findings with testbeds or field experiments.
Limitations. The attacker may try to determine the best threshold dynamically when
mitigations are deployed. In that case the channel capacity will vary but it will be
bounded by the limits of the model without path hopping, moving between similar
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curves like shown in Fig. 3. To completely model and analyse the situation with strate-
gies for dynamic threshold setting, one would need significantly more complex math-
ematical and formal models. Our UPPAAL model would allow this latter exploration
rather effectively. In theory, the channel capacity can be reduced to zero, as shown in
Example 4. However, completely eliminating covert channels is impossible in practice.
Related work. Applying formal methods to networking has gained considerable in-
terest in the last decade, including use of programming language techniques for de-
scribing networks and SDN, as well as formal verification and model-checking applied
to ensuring properties. An example is Kuai, a model checker for safety and network-
consistency properties of SDN [18]. Network components are specified generically as in
our CARMA approach, and the network topology is specified separately. This research
considers whether classical Boolean safety properties are true of all traces, but cannot
assess these properties probabilistically, unlike our approach.
Statistical model checking of discrete-time probabilistic models has been used to
evaluate different selective strategies for mitigating telephony Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks [16], and an distributed DoS attack on the TCAM memory of SDN switches
[19]. Our research considers covert channel attacks rather than (D)DoS and we focus on
continuous-time reasoning allowing for assessment of performance as well as reasoning
about the attack. Translating UML models to UPPAAL has been used for reasoning
about SDN [20]. Our approach takes a more direct approach to specify topologies which
allows straightforward scaling up of network size.
To disrupt timing channel attacks in cryptographic schemes, bucketing which in-
volves accumulation of messages followed by batch sending [15, 9] and evaluation of
randomised countermeasures using SMT solvers [10] are two techniques which have
been applied. This research has similarities to the path hopping mitigation but is applied
in a different context. Researchers have proposed a defence for web-fingerprinting at-
tacks in anonymised networks where bursts of packets are padded to make them less
traceable [13]. Our methods might also help to study trade-offs in anonymity networks
like TOR and we are currently considering how our approach can be applied to the
Meltdown-like attacks.
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